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Deformations of conscience
Pseudonorms in Dietrich von Hildebrand’s approach
1. Pseudonorms and moral 
and antimoral idols
Formulation of legitimate con-
science judgements is disrupted by 
moral substitutes, or pseudonorms, 
which operate in our moral con-
sciousness. Irrespective of whether 
they arise through our fault or not, 
that is whether we acquire them 
consciously or as a result of our naivety, they distort our judgements of 
moral good.1 Dietrich von Hildebrand divides these pseudonorms into: 
1) formal substitutes and 2) material and qualitative substitutes. 
The first type is called formal, because in our judgements and 
behaviour, instead of observing authentic moral norms, we follow 
 1 The issue of moral substitutes is addressed by Dietrich von Hildebrand in his works: Graven 
Images: Substitutes for True Morality, New York 1957; German edition Substitute für wahre Sittlichkeit, 
in: Idolkult und Gotteskult, Regensburg 1974, pp. 13–190 (Gesammelte Werke, 7); Liturgie und 
Persönlichkeit, in: Idolkult und Gotteskult, op. cit., pp. 191–300; selected passages: Christian Ethics, 
New York 1952; German edition Ethik, Regensburg 1973 (Gesammelte Werke, 2). Study of these 
issues: J. Gorczyca, Dietricha von Hildebranda koncepcja poznania wartości moralnych, „Analecta 
Cracoviensia” 19 (1987), pp. 427–439; T. Biesaga, Świadomościowe i osobowe warunki odpowiedzial-
ności, in: O odpowiedzialności. Moralny wymiar odpowiedzialności w życiu publicznym, ed. J. Pawlica, 
Kraków 1993, pp. 67–74 and in „Studia Philosophiae Christianae” 29 (1993), no. 2, pp. 27–37; 
D. Wiśniewska, Rodzaje i rola substytutów w moralności w ujęciu Dietricha von Hildebranda, „Logos 
i Ethos” 2014 no. 2 (37), pp. 77–98.
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extra-moral norms such as a) laws of the state, b) tradition, or c) 
progressivism or liberalism.
In material, or qualitative, substantive substitutes, morality is 
identified with a) that which is honourable and dishonourable, b) 
spontaneity, humaneness, warmth of heart, c) duty, or d) faithfulness, 
loyalty to friends, e) altruism, f) self-control, g) the attitude of avoidance 
of anything risky (never too much), h) accommodating oneself to the 
decent (decent man), or i) the ideal of the gentleman, etc.2
Moral substitutes are normative standards which operate in 
consciousness, and which regulate conduct as conduct in line with moral 
values, obligations and norms, even though in their scope and substance 
they do not match that which is delineated by proper moral values and 
norms.3 We distinguish moral substitutes from proper moral norms 
in that the former ones substitute for and formally, and to some extent 
materially, or substantively imitate moral norms, without being them. 
They substitute for morality based on cognition of moral values and on 
an appropriate response to values4 that which is provided by statutory 
law or existing tradition, or which is determined by certain extra-moral 
values deemed most important, or certain morally significant values that 
are selected and isolated from other values; examples of such substitutes 
include honour, faithfulness and loyalty, decency, or personal spontaneity, 
authenticity and self-loyalty. Pseudonorms do not cover the whole sphere 
of morality; they distort it by turning into moral obligations things 
which are not moral obligations, or conversely – by excluding proper 
moral obligations.
 2 See D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., pp. 39–51.
 3 See D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 6.
 4 For kinds of responses to a value, what their conformity with values is about see D. v. 
Hildebrand, Christian Ethics, op. cit., pp. 191–241; T. Biesaga, Dietricha von Hildebranda epistemolo-
giczno- ontologiczne podstawy etyki, Lublin 1989, pp. 107–134; T. Biesaga, Spór o normę moralno-
ści, Kraków 1998, p. 81nn; T. Biesaga, Emocjonalna odpowiedź na wartość u podstaw życia moral-
nego, in: Konteksty podmiotowej świadomości, ed. E. Podrez, R. Moń, Olecko 2003 (Episteme, 29), 
pp. 91–100.
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Moral substitutes need to be differentiated from another type of defor-
mations of moral consciousness in a person. They differ from pathologi-
cal deformations of the sphere of morality. Pathological pressure arises 
outside our rational consciousness and drives people to various actions. 
It requires establishment of the psychiatric or psychological causes of 
these processes or biological and mental states, as well as employment 
of a suitable therapy.
Pseudonorms also differ from the adopted anti- or a-moral idols, 
models of conduct.5 Among the antimoral theories that reject morality 
in favour of the sensations of pleasure Hildebrand reckons hedonism 
of Aristippus of Cyrene. His rejection of importance-in-itself, and even 
a person’s objective good in favour of that which is subjectively pleasant or 
satisfying is tantamount to rejection of not only the qualitative dimension 
of morality, but also its formal dimension inherent in moral obligation. 
Aristippus finds both these dimensions illusive; they need to be removed 
with a view to a subjective sensation of pleasure. He considers to be wise 
him who does not accept any norm and is only actuated by the quest 
for subjective satisfaction. “To seek pleasure in a reasonable manner 
– according to Aristippus of Cyrene – is definitely not a norm which 
addresses itself to our conscience, which obliges us, and makes us feel 
guilty if we do not conform to it. Failure to conform is here not a matter 
of wickedness, but of foolishness.”6 The same position can be found in 
Machiavelli, who also recommends not caring whether something is 
morally good or evil, but whether it is planned and advantageous. In both 
the theories moral obligation is dismissed, and even if it is disturbing, it 
should be rejected.
The theory put forward by Friedrich Nietzsche features a battle against 
that which expresses the formal eidos of morality. “He rejects a norm 
above ourselves which would oblige us to obey and which would appeal 
to our conscience; he wants to «liberate» man, by ousting the notion 
of guilt. He wants to replace morality, as such, by something radically 
 5 See D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 4.
 6 D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 7.
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amoral, which even in its most formal character has nothing in common 
with morality.”7
Even if in the proposition of the overman he accepts the formal sig-
nificance of value, he does not justify it, neither from the position of that 
which is subjectively satisfactory, nor from the position of the objective 
good for a person. Without any proof he presupposes that the idea of 
the overman is the supreme value, one might say – an extra-moral value 
which needs to be realised, while rejecting the existence of moral values 
which are the effect of resentment. He declares a war on the sphere of 
morality and substitutes extra-moral values for it.
Nietzsche’s theory and similar theories are not straight substitutes for 
morality, because a substitute is a more or less experienced and spontane-
ously applied moral norm or a standard of conduct, whereas a straight 
philosophical theory is not a norm like this. Still, one can ask in what way 
a theory of someone’s devising can become a pseudonorm of conduct.
Hildebrand uses the example of Raskolnikov in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s 
Crime and Punishment to analyse this issue. In this case, Raskolnikov 
does not reject all moral values; he holds many of these in high regard 
and condemns immoral attitudes, but he fails to understand the sanctity 
of human life. He does not evince any visible difficulties concerned with 
experiencing or grasping moral values. Having murdered the old lady, he 
is in anguish over his deed, overwhelmed by the pangs of his conscience 
and desperately trying to be free from this burden. What then made him 
commit the murder? What does he refer to as he tries to extricate himself 
from guilt? That which drove him to the crime was a conviction, founded 
on the adopted theory, whereby the old lady’s life was of no value, and her 
money could be used to promote his own intellectual and creative talents. 
Thus, the theory in which extra-moral values and intellectual values had 
been put on a pedestal resulted in relativisation of the quality of some-
one’s life. Raskolnikov did not trust his direct experience of morality, but 
made it conditional upon the theory he had adopted and developed. He 
found his experience of moral values to be a mere social construct which 
 7 D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 4.
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could or even should be easily subverted in his intellectual deliberations. 
Because of this his intellectual argumentation was geared towards em-
phasising the value of his own genius which was needed and necessary 
for humanity, and which could be developed with the old lady’s money. 
Thus, the erroneous theory which he devised and developed aroused in 
him a belief that the elimination of the unnecessary woman was the right 
thing to do. This can be called theoretical, partial moral blindness to 
certain moral values. Thus, the theory someone has constructed becomes 
a cover which hides some moral or morally relevant values, and which 
confuses our convictions by suggesting that our experience of the value 
of another person as a sacred value is misleading, because this value is 
merely conventional and cultural and does not have a categorical charac-
ter of a moral obligation. Thus, an erroneous theory perverts the sphere 
of convictions and justifies immoral actions.
The description of blindness caused by an erroneous theory, which 
covers certain moral values and excludes them from the group of values 
generating a moral obligation, reveals certain mechanisms for pseudo-
norms arising in our moral consciousness. Blindness caused by a theory 
which someone has accepted and which forms their axiological con-
victions may engage in interplay with the blindness resulting from the 
overemphasis on extra-moral values and from the effect of pride and 
concupiscence.8 Raskolnikov had a very high regard for extra-moral val-
ues embodied in intellectually outstanding and strong personalities who 
effectively pursue their own goals.  His admiration and reverence for the 
effectiveness and power of great personalities undermined in him the 
belief about the value of this mediocre old woman’s life. Next to the over-
emphasis on the significance of intellectual values, we can also discern 
his aloof and haughty ego which sees its value not in the pursuit of moral 
values but intellectual talents. And so various forms of partial blindness 
to moral values may result from the adoption of an erroneous theory, the 
overemphasis on extra-moral values and the effect of the haughty and 
concupiscent personal self.
 8 See D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 19.
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2. Pseudonorms of legalism and anarchism
In relation to amoral and anti-moral idols, which flatly reject mora-
lity, moral substitutes distinguish themselves in that in our consciousness 
they perform a function of moral norms, or play the role of the criterion 
for good and evil. Depending on the kind, these pseudonorms deform 
the sphere of morality differently.
For many people statutory law may become a substitute, a moral 
pseudonorm taking the place of proper moral norms. The state as such 
is an important and indispensable good for an individual and the com-
munity. It is a guardian of order and social justice. “State authority is 
a legitimate norm in its proper frame. State laws should be respected so 
long as they have no immoral character, or so long as they do not pass 
beyond the sphere of competency of the state authority.”9 Even if some-
one takes the stance whereby the state law is morally binding upon us, 
neither the law nor the state authority can be identified with morality. 
Statutory law is one among many other morally relevant goods, and by 
many of them, on account of their higher standing, it can be surpassed.10 
Equating or replacing the categorical moral obligation, the majesty and 
metaphysical profundity of the sphere of morality with the state autho-
rity is a crude and primitive mistake. This results in substituting loyalty 
to some external social structure for the most profound sphere of man’s 
life. Such loyalty is treated as the most basic virtue representing all of the 
moral reality. Loyalty to the state authority and the statutory law then 
becomes tantamount to being a just and morally good man. The scope 
of morality then becomes limited to that which is prescribed by state law.
Such a mistake can be compounded by the criminal law fact. In this 
kind of law, punishments for committed evil are prescribed and enforced. 
Such a case reveals a clear connection between criminal law and morality. 
As it penalises crimes, thefts, etc., the state also does this in the name of 
morality. In this way it lays emphasis on the goods protected by statutory 
 9 D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 133.
 10 See D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 134.
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law, which as morally relevant goods are also protected by moral law. 
Even with such a convergence of the statutory law and morality it must 
be observed that the state punishment is not the same as penance for 
the evil done, for the sins. Even if the state forgives the criminal, once he 
has served his punishment, he should entreat forgiveness for the crimes 
committed not only of people, but above all of God. As regards crime, 
neither the state, nor the victim’s loved ones are in a position to forgive 
the irreversible evil. They can only forgive their own bereavement and 
turn to God’s mercy. This is expressed in the saying: “I forgive you, but 
may God forgive you.” Here we probe into the depths of good and evil, 
the mystery of redemption and salvation.
While we do not deny the benefits of the statutory law and criminal 
law, we need to discern the differences between the order and legal prin-
ciples on the one hand, and moral principles and norms on the other 
hand.  Morality may contain that which is forbidden and penalised by 
criminal law, but in its scope, substance and profundity morality is not 
limited to that. The state does not penalise an absence of love or humil-
ity, envy, hatred, religious indifference, etc., but these are moral vices. 
Still, the law that penalises crime emphasises the import of moral norms 
and hence it can be easily treated as a manifestation of the essence of 
morality, or morality as such. Someone might view the state authority 
and statutory law as the real area of moral obligations, relegating to the 
background other obligations as vague and optional. They might equate 
state decrees with moral commandments. Thus, they are coming closer 
to the situation in which morality gets supplanted by the pseudonorm of 
statutory law. This is typically done by a moral bureaucrat whose sensitiv-
ity and moral sensibilities have dissipated and their place has been taken 
by blind adherence to the decrees of state institutions.
Statutory law becomes a fully-fledged moral substitute when some-
one in their experiences equates state decrees with moral obligations.11 
In a situation like this, moral principles do not have their origin in the 
experience of moral values or the experience of a person’s dignity, that is 
 11 See D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 135.
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the experience of the sphere of values in their specificity and hierarchical 
order, on which predicated is encapsulation of the specificity, categoricity 
and profundity of moral values as such. The place of the direct, intuitive 
cognition of values is taken by the external state decree.  In the face of 
this overemphasised authority of statutory law the proper sources of and 
criteria for good and evil pale or vanish, and only that which is prescribed 
by conventional statutory law becomes moral.
Two distortions of the sphere of morality can be distinguished in this 
process. The first one is about endowing all that is prescribed by statutory 
law with a character of moral precepts, whereas the second one – which 
is even worse – is about limiting the whole sphere of morality only 
to that which is prescribed by statutory law. In the former case, extra-
moral and immoral decrees of statutory law too will be recognised as 
moral, while in the latter case all morality will be narrowed down to 
statutory law, thereby excluding from the sphere of morality that which 
exceeds statutory law, and treating these values and norms as irrelevant 
or optional. The deformation of morality in the latter case is the most 
extensive, because not only do extra-moral and immoral precepts of 
statutory law become recognised as moral, but a broad spectrum of 
moral obligations binding upon us will be abolished in the name and 
for the sake of a narrow set of morally relevant, extra-moral and immoral 
state precepts. The Leviathan state then arrays itself in the divine-like 
majesty, which dictates to us what is good and what is evil, and which 
decides about our humanity, and in a way about our salvation. The state 
becomes the idol, and our attitude towards it becomes idolatry. In 
this substitute, in this idolatry, morality is stripped of a true absolute 
character, which – to use Kierkegaard’s expression – might be called 
a “breath of eternity;” it is secularised, flattened, devoid of its profundity 
and supplanted by worship of earthly idols.
Replacing morality with a pseudonorm of statutory law, that is con-
ventional reality, strips morality of its proper nature, because it results 
in rejection of its universal applicability, and in relativisation of its rel-
evance. Morality becomes a matter of taste, arrangement, changes and 
strong influence in legalisation by, e.g., individual or social deviation.
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If formal substitutes overemphasise external sources of morality, 
e.g. the state, race, class, culture, custom, the ideology of progress, then 
qualitative substitutes overemphasise inner, subjective sources of mora-
lity. One might even say that the subjective distortions of morality are an 
extreme reaction to normativeness, external prescriptiveness and to the 
prescriptiveness of authentic, categorical moral obligations. In qualita-
tive substitutes morality is identified with personal, personality-related, 
morally relevant or directly moral values, which take on the role of a cri-
terion for good and evil, the role of the norm of morality as such. Thus, for 
instance, a sense of honour, authenticity, spontaneous impulsiveness, 
cordiality or sensitivity, and even personal altruism are personal values, 
but they may become substitutes for morality, distorting that which is de-
termined by moral values. Treating independence, freedom, authenticity 
or unconstrained emotional spontaneity in oneself as an expression of the 
essence of morality as such may be a defensive reaction to morality im-
posed from outside, or a reaction to the overly experienced normativeness 
of authentic moral values. In their nature, hierarchical degree and supe-
riority to other values, moral values are characterised by categoricity that 
does not yield to the pressure of someone’s freedom or spontaneity, but 
comes across to us in the experience of guilt. An accusation, a judgement 
of our ego is a painful moment, or even unbearable and so the above-
mentioned pseudonorms want to free us from it.
Those who follow the pseudonorm of absolute independence, spon-
taneity, authenticity or loyalty to only one’s own impulses may find all 
moral norms calling for control over these spontaneous impulses to be 
of an enslaving and oppressive character. In Hildebrand’s opinion such 
behaviours can be observed especially in Slavic nations. “Every rule, ev-
ery precept is seen as something inhuman, cool, heartless and, more-
over, conventional and artificial. (…) The morally good is identified with 
spontaneity, warm unconventionality, the possession of a sensitive over-
flowing heart. What is morally evil tends to be identified with loyalty to 
juridical obligations, correctness, bureaucratism, or cool reasonability.”12
 12 D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 41.
118 Tadeusz Biesaga, S.D.B.
Such people may discern a broader spectrum of moral values, but they 
judge themselves and others primarily by the criterion of authenticity 
and unhindered spontaneity. Even if they notice that someone in their 
impulsive behaviour has acted immorally, they judge him positively if 
he has acted spontaneously, effusively and sincerely.13 In a case like this, 
the moral judgement is made only as a result of establishing whether 
something is an effect of independence, spontaneity, freedom. Someone’s 
spontaneous behaviour, their loyalty to spontaneity and their admission 
of it are used by such a judgement to justify evil. This option only requires 
this kind of moral exhibitionism, boasting of betrayal, abortion for us to 
find that we are dealing with an authentic, good man, and consequently 
with an authentic and hence good deed. Persons who embrace the 
substitute of spontaneity and authenticity in conduct as the criterion 
for good and evil treat moral conduct governed by universal norms as 
a distortion of morality, and hypocrisy. Adherents of absolute authenticity 
treat all moral effort as cynical, insincere exaltation which stands in 
contradiction to natural sincerity. In their opinion it is striving after the 
moral ideal that strips our nature of its peculiar aspirations. This nature 
should manifest itself in its impulsiveness, directness and by extension 
in its authenticity. They view striving after one’s own moral perfection 
as pretentious pharisaism. They want to oppose that by spontaneous, 
controversial deeds intended to shake the existing morality, which in 
a way imposes on us morally illegitimate requirements.14 
The pseudonorm of self-loyalty, one’s independence and impulsive 
unconstrainedness thus construed “not only does it darken the true 
hierarchy of moral values, but it deform the ethos and falsifies the entire 
morality.” 15 Such a deformation primarily consists in isolating and 
overemphasising certain values. A single selected value, e.g. authenticity 
or spontaneity of the heart, is not assigned to other moral values and 
norms, but is extended to cover the whole sphere of morality, that is 
 13 See D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 47.
 14 See D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 47.
 15 D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 47.
119 Deformations of conscience
viewed as expressive of the essence of moral values, that is as a criterion 
for good and evil. In this way the qualitative nature of moral values gets 
destroyed. Besides, the selected personal value, as the only proper and 
binding one, is aggressively opposed to other moral values. “Many moral 
values are omitted and overlooked, as in the case of naïve substitutes; 
and there are moral values which are even opposed as being pseudo-
morality.”16 In combatting other moral values, this substitute takes on 
a character of heretical apostasy. It does not always result in, say, leaving 
the Church. Many Christians and Catholics who have embraced the 
substitute of their individual independence and unconstrained emotional 
impulsiveness remain part of the Church community. Still, they can be 
actively involved in combatting many Christian values which in their 
opinion restrict their personal reactions, choices, decisions. As they do 
this in a sense in the name of their sovereignty, the authenticity of their 
choices, they are out to change the moral teachings of the Church and 
adjust them to their own imaginings. Following only a few selected values 
results in cutting morality off its roots in the Christian humanism and 
the Christian Revelation, as well as in secularisation and relativisation of 
this humanism.
Regardless of whether the above substitute is manifested as naive 
or heretical, deliberate and aggressive involvement, one might say that 
underlying it is the illegitimate act of making one’s own selection, out 
of the whole spectrum of the sphere of morality, of personal values and 
recognising them as moral norms, as criteria for good and evil to be 
applied to the whole sphere of morality only because they have been 
personally selected.
The attitude of spontaneity and authenticity of reactive habits in action 
opens the door to irrationality, subjectivity as well as passion and pride. 
A man following such a pseudonorm can easily fall victim to his own 
passions, recognising that their unconstrained, spontaneous fulfilment is 
a manifestation of his authenticity and hence is something good. Despite 
his concupiscence, even sexual perversion or marital infidelity, he will 
 16 D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., pp. 57–58.
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boast of his actions, because in them he feels free of hypocrisy and acts 
according to the dictates of his corporeal and emotional states.
3. The concupiscent self and the proud self in the formation of 
moral pseudonorms
A major role in the formation of pseudonorms in our behaviour is 
played by our relation with extra-moral goods as well as with pride and 
concupiscence. There are, in us, various forms of silencing the proud 
self or the concupiscent self by the righteous-humble-loving self, as well 
as various forms of weakening, silencing or eliminating of the current 
operation of the righteous-humble-loving self in favour of the concu-
piscent self or the proud self. There may be in us various blends of pride 
and concupiscence resulting in various forms of weakening, silencing or 
eliminating of the righteous-humble-loving self.17
A man overpowered by satanic pride views all moral precepts as 
imposed and hateful forms of his own enslavement. The higher moral or 
religious values are, the more they jar on his pride, and as a result not 
only does he disregard them, but he also undertakes to knock them off 
their pedestal, dethrone them and trample on them. The satanistically 
proud self finds its fulfilment in the destruction of the unbearable and 
hateful majesty of moral values so as to debase these values, thus becom-
ing free from them. It does not focus on constructing anything, but finds 
its fulfilment in and derives a kind of erotic and sadistic satisfaction from 
dragging through the mire, deriding and degrading the highest moral 
and religious values.
In a similar manner, but for different reasons, moral precepts are re-
jected by the self overpowered by bestial concupiscence. Overpowered 
by concupiscence, it treats morality either as an obstacle or as a nebulous 
utopia that is not binding on it. Driven by the desire for extra-moral 
values related to its sexuality or possession of various material goods, it 
 17 For a description of personal centres conducive to and preventing a proper response to a val-
ue see D. v. Hildebrand, Christian Ethics, op. cit., pp. 408–452.
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constructs its own rules of guile, exploitation of others, deceit and ruth-
lessness. It becomes an insidious and dangerous predator equipped not 
only with physical strength, but also with the weapon of instrumental 
reason subordinated to passion, which devises effective ways of fulfilling 
those passions.
People overpowered by concupiscence or pride are more susceptible 
to accepting various pseudonorms, or moral substitutes. One might 
say that they are by definition receptive to moral pseudonorms. The 
condition for providing the right response to a value is the primacy of 
the righteous-humble-loving self in us. Adequatio cordis et voluntatis ad 
valorem requires liberating oneself from the decisive role of the proud 
self and the concupiscent self. Coming into alignment with moral values 
requires cognitive openness, openness of the heart so that we can provide 
a response in line with the nature of these values, with the positiveness 
or negativeness of the value, with the hierarchical standing of a given 
value, so that our will can follow that which has been recognised and 
experienced as a moral obligation, with a view to realising a given value.
When the satanistically proud self or the bestially concupiscent self 
is dominant, the proper response to moral values is replaced with a re-
sponse to extra-moral and anti-moral values. Thus, a man overpowered 
by pride or concupiscence is open to replacing morality with something 
else. As regards statutory law, he can easily accept that that which needs 
to be reckoned with while realising the proud ego or the concupiscent 
ego is statutory law, criminal law. He can accept this substitute for pure-
ly utilitarian reasons, that is because the costs of attaining his goals and 
being subject to sentences are too high, because it is better to be a loyal 
and respectable citizen, because as you command that respect, it is easier 
to lead others up the garden path, climb the social ladder and amass more 
goods to the satisfaction of one’s concupiscence or pride. Such a man 
might want to be a loyal and respectable citizen, because this way he is 
not excluded from the community by being stigmatised with a sentence 
or imprisonment. In other words, he discerns the benefit of loyalty to the 
realisation of his ego overwhelmed by concupiscence, because on this 
plane he can practically achieve more egoistic
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goals than if he relegated himself onto the margins of society.
A man overwhelmed by pride is all the more likely to accept the sub-
stitute of loyalty to the state, because the state does not question pride, 
while moral law does. His pride could even be helped by participation in 
social and political life, in a variety of circles enjoying recognition, and 
by holding important positions or receiving distinctions. Thus, loyalty to 
the state lets the proud man free himself from moral precepts, substitute 
statutory law for morality, and on top of that be regarded as a noble and 
morally honest man, that is exploit moral values to indulge his egoism.18 
Also to a man overpowered by concupiscence statutory law appears 
to be less demanding than morality, and hence more attractive than 
moral laws. Even though it imposes on him restrictions relative to his 
desire, especially with regard to that which belongs to his neighbour or 
his fellow citizen, the proud man, while acting as a loyal citizen, will find 
innumerable opportunities to satisfy his desire through acts prohibited 
by moral law. “The condemnation of concupiscence is not only restricted 
to certain crimes, but the confrontation with the ultimate seriousness 
and majesty of the moral law is a greater scandal for concupiscence than 
submission the state law.”19 
The substitute of legalism with regard to the state is damaging to the 
morality of not only the individual but also of the society. It gives rise 
to the emergence of unusually dangerous social phenomena. It opens 
the door to threatening ideologies. By intensifying pride it is easy to 
arouse attitudes of partisan, class or national egoism. Inspired by pride 
and desire, Nazism and communism arose out of trust in and idolatry 
as to the state and social structures. Nazism was driven by the pride of 
the German nation, while communism by the desire for material goods 
owned by the bourgeoisie. The Nazis would explain their crimes against 
other nations by the pride of racial superiority, while communists ex-
plained their destruction of other social classes by the desire for posses-
sion of the things possessed by others. Both ideologies reinforced their 
 18 See D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 138.
 19 D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 139.
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destructive activities by legalising their criminal acts within the state 
structures.
In quite a subtle manner pride can support substitutes related to the 
individual ego, which in its self-assessment chooses some of its own 
extra-moral personal values, such as independence, authenticity, spon-
taneity, honour, courage, etc. As they indulge someone’s egoistic sense of 
greatness, these values reinforce them in their belief that no one else but 
they alone can decide what is important, valuable or binding on them. As 
a rule, moral values and obligations jar on pride. The higher moral values 
are in the hierarchy, the more jarring and intolerable they are. The proud 
man who boasts of his independence and courage will as a rule turn to 
destroying the highest moral values and norms that might threaten to 
limit his puffed-up ego. He can do it in the name of various extra-moral 
values, indulging his proud and concupiscent self. A man like this, e.g. 
as an artist, may in the name of aesthetic values destroy subtle moral or 
religious values.  For this purpose, use may be made of satanist perfor-
mances in which in the name of ostensible aesthetic, artistic and cultural 
values, moral and religious values become soiled. Therefore, the satanist, 
nihilistic destruction of Christian values makes use of real and osten-
sible extra-moral values such as someone’s freedom, musical, literary or 
dramatic talent, etc. By indulging pride and concupiscence, those extra-
moral values which are elevated to the highest place become the idol 
calling for the dethronement and destruction of the proper moral values.
Discovering in oneself pseudonorms and moral substitutes enables 
overcoming moral deformations. “There is no doubt – writes Hilde-
brand – that true morality imperatively calls for a cleansing from the 
perversions resulting from any substitute, and the more so as the sub-
stitute recedes qualitatively from true moral goodness. But the aboli-
tion of the substitute is desirable only if the substitute is replaced by 
true morality. If, on the contrary, it is replaced by an anti-moral idol 
or by a complete vacu um, the last things will be worse than the first.”20 
This is because when compared with total moral indifference, amoral or 
 20 D. v. Hildebrand, Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality, op. cit., p. 173.
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anti-moral idols, and despite the deformation of morality, substitutes are 
less damaging to morality than the idols. One should free oneself from 
them in a movement in the direction of true morality, and not against 
morality as such.
4. From pseudonorms to moral maturity
A phenomenological and essential characterisation of the types of 
pseudonorms in moral consciousness does not exhaust all the determi-
nants and factors affecting the workings of the conscience. Biological, 
neurological and pathological determinants are also of importance, as 
they influence the way axiological and moral judgements are formed. 
They are analysed in neuroscience, psychiatry, psychology and sociol-
ogy of morality.21 Both an interdisciplinary and synthetic approach to 
all these factors as one whole is very difficult, because each one of these 
disciplines has its own methodological assumptions and the narrow as-
pect of research determined by them. Methodological reductionism does 
not justify using philosophical, anthropological or axiological reduction-
ism in the synthesis of the issue in question. Given the above, insights 
into a person’s functioning on the plane of moral consciousness assert 
their own autonomy and can be presented independently of the research 
presented in other sciences and philosophical trends. Still, looking for 
hidden, presupposed determinants of axiological consciousness as well 
as recommending practical guidance on overcoming those determinants 
is common to various sciences and philosophical trends.
In this respect, the phenomenology and eidetics of moral 
consciousness reveal within their method hidden determinants as to the 
formation of moral judgements, pointing to the path to moral maturity. 
Those practical suggestions are particularly useful to ethics, psychology 
 21 See K. Murawski, Jaźń i sumienie. Filozoficzne zagadnienia rozwoju duchowego człowieka 
w pracach Carla Gustawa Junga i Antoniego Kępińskiego, Wrocław 1987, passim; R. Stach, Sumienie 
i mózg. O wewnętrznym regulatorze zachowań moralnych, Kraków 2012, passim; Fenomen sumie-
nia, ed. D. Adamczyk, Kielce 2012, passim.
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of morality, self-upbringing as well as moral and spiritual development. 
The above-mentioned determinants relative to the formation of 
pseudonorms consist in giving precedence to various extra-moral values 
over moral values as well as in the influence of the concupiscent self 
and the proud self. The deformations of the sphere of morality are also 
caused by neglect and errors related to the cognition of moral values 
and regarding the discovery of their nature and their standing in the 
hierarchy of values.  Beside the purely cognitive sphere, a major role is 
played by the emotional response to a value. Adequatio cordis ad valorem 
is a subjective and personal acceptance of moral values, a discernment and 
acknowledgement of their special, categorical moral obligation generated 
by the values. It is the formation of an emotional response to a value that 
features the essential drama of acceptance and choice between values 
in themselves and the values of that which is subjectively satisfactory, 
as well as between moral values and extra-moral values. Moral values 
display their profundity, are a breath of eternity, refer us to God, enable 
overcoming of superficial responses to them and opposing various 
pseudonorms governing our conduct. This type of moral development 
is possible owing to living an appropriate spiritual life. In such a life we 
mature morally enough to better discern the transcendence of moral 
values in contrast to that which is temporary, relative and evanescent. 
We mature enough to be morally responsible in a manner exceeding 
personal psychological, social or cultural entanglements. We exceed 
pseudonorms founded on that which is only subjectively satisfactory, 
which indulges our concupiscence and pride, and we do it in favour of 
objective moral obligations. We exceed pseudonorms founded on extra-
moral values propagated by society, the state, culture or ideology. We 
break free from inner and outer enslavement, coming closer to authentic 
freedom transcending short-term interest, in the name of the call of 
the moral and morally relevant values, in the name of the fullness of 
humanity, the fullness of the bond with people and God. 
Cleansing oneself of pseudonorms and maturing enough to em-
brace the fullness of moral consciousness is close to that which is de-
scribed by contemporary psychology. Hildebrand was quite critical of 
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psychoanalysis, in which the subject is trapped within immanent analysis 
of his processes and does not have transcendent criteria for moral judge-
ments.22 This type of knowledge about neutral processes which omits 
other areas of human life is imperfect, incomplete and insufficient to 
serve as the basis for real self-knowledge, which is possible in the context 
of complete truth about man. Closer to Hildebrand’s axiological phe-
nomenology is humanistic psychology, in which the sphere of objective 
values plays a crucial role in the maturation of moral consciousness.
Different psychological, behavioural, psychoanalytical, humanistic-
existential trends describe different layers or aspects of the workings of 
the conscience. The former ones present them within the framework of 
empirical, psychological and sociological processes of imitation, social 
mechanisms of learning, internalisation of values and norms, formation 
of the ought self and the ideal self. Despite the differences in the descrip-
tion of these processes, the comprehensive approaches come closer to 
developmental theories which distinguish specific stages, from the stage 
of conformism to the stage of being driven by one’s own ideals, where 
autonomous morality is attained.23 For instance, “a child submits to the 
principles and norms imposed by adults. [...] With age the morality of 
obedience grows weaker and yields ground to autonomous morality 
based on the mutual respect of reciprocity.”24 In the last stage of moral 
maturity, an adolescent or an adult is capable of going beyond the phase 
of social conformism, revising their own conventional morality shaped 
by the existing community, culture and the state, and constructing sub-
jective, personal and autonomous morality with the benefit of self-reflec-
tion and self-analysis. Psychologically, this process is quite complicated, 
and in Kazimierz Dąbrowski’s opinion it requires multi-layered positive 
disintegration, thanks to which we move from instinctive, herd-based 
life up to the level of individual life, where the moral judgements are 
 22 See D. von Hildebrand, Przemienienie w Chrystusie, trans. J. Zychowicz, Kraków 1982, p. 41.
 23 Cf. P. Kurtek, A. Lasota, Wybrane psychologiczne aspekty struktury i rozwoju sumienia, in: 
Fenomen sumienia, op. cit., p. 59.
 24 P. Kurtek, A. Lasota, Wybrane psychologiczne aspekty struktury i rozwoju sumienia, op. cit., 
p. 62.
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founded on one’s own ought self, who lives in the world of higher values, 
including moral ones.25
The cognitive-developmental trend in psychology lays greater em-
phasis on the subject’s active participation in all the formative phases of 
moral identity and conscience. Stress is laid on the cognitive role in the 
formation of moral judgements, in the experience of emotional approval 
or disapproval. Emphasis is even laid on the role of virtues in the integra-
tion and consolidation of our moral identity, in a way the power of our 
ego in the face of difficulties and conflicts.26
Discernible are some similarities between the psychological and phe-
nomenological approaches to the conscience. One might say that at the 
stage of conformism we follow social pseudonorms, legalism with regard 
to the state, social and cultural norms. We give in to subjective pleasures 
generated by the instinctive concupiscent and proud self. As we head 
towards moral, subjective, personal and autonomous maturity, we put 
effort into making our righteous- humble-loving self overcome the nega-
tive personal centres and become the foundation for moral judgements.
The effort aimed at letting that self has its say, to shed pseudonorms 
for the sake of authentic morality is associated by Hildebrand with the 
acquisition of proper moral attitudes. A description of these attitudes is 
contained in both the 1993 book entitled Fundamental Moral Attitudes 
(Sittliche Grundhaltungen), published in Germany against the backdrop 
of the rising Nazi ideology, and the 1965 extended version of the same 
book, published in the USA under the title of The Art of Living.27 Apart 
from the fundamental attitudes mentioned in the first publication, such 
as righteousness, loyalty, a sense of responsibility, goodness and respect 
for the truth, the second publication includes, among other things, an 
additional attitude of hope and the role of virtues. Hildebrand makes 
 25 Cf. K. Dąbrowski, Osobowość i jej kształtowanie poprzez dezintegrację pozytywną, Lublin 1984, 
passim.
 26 Cf. P. Kurtek, A. Lasota, Wybrane psychologiczne aspekty struktury i rozwoju sumienia, op. 
cit., p. 64.
 27 D. v. Hildebrand, Fundamentalne postawy moralne, trans. K. Meissner OSB, in: Wobec war-
tości, Kraków 1984, pp. 11–54; D. v. Hildebrand, A. v. Hildebrand, The Art of Living, Chicago 1965.
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spiritual maturation – connected with the personal bond with Jesus 
Christ, conversion and inner transformation – intrinsic to psychological 
or personality-related moral maturation. He describes these phenomena 
in the book entitled Transformation in Christ, where next to such atti-
tudes as repentance, simplicity, humility, the reader can find descriptions 
of attitudes connected with the spiritual bond with God, such as trust in 
God, holy patience, holy meekness, holy mercy, holy sorrow, true sur-
render of self.
The works promoting mature morality were published by Hildebrand 
during the dramatic period witnessing the rise of the dangerous Nazi 
ideology, which captivated broad masses of the nation.  It was already 
at the source of that dangerous ideology that he could expose its 
pseudonorms, to which he opposed Christian morality. Today his 
descriptions of the authentic personalistic and Christian morality can 
be applied to expose the currently emergent ideologies that enforce their 
own set of pseudonorms instead of authentic moral norms. They can be 
used to expose secularist ideologies that ruin the connection between 
morality and that which is transcendent, eternal, Divine. They can 
also be used to expose the pseudo-moral principles of the neo-Marxist 
gender ideology, which in effect imposes on society new and damaging 
utopias through various forms of social engineering which are – unlike 
in the Marxist bottom-up scheme – imposed in a top-down manner by 
various international, influential and powerful institutions and social 
organisations.
Abstract 
The paper presents a description of moral pseudo norms, which displace proper mor-
al norms from our consciousness and action as well as distort our morality. The study 
analyzes mainly the pseudo norms that generate the fundamentals of legalism and their 
opposition – the fundamentals of moral anarchism. The first groups of pseudo norms 
identifies morality with civil law, especially criminal law. On the other hand the other 
group of pseudo norms, equates morality with what is spontaneous, impulsive, authentic. 
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The paper analyzes not only the scope and content related distortion of moral norms 
caused by the substitutes of morality, but it also reveals the reasons of creating the pseudo 
norms in our consciousness. These reasons are induced by the impact of the pride center 
and the concupiscent center on our value response and by preferring the extra moral val-
ues over the moral ones. Exposing the mechanism of functioning of the pseudo norms in 
our moral consciousness is useful not only for ethics but also for psychology and peda-
gogy as well as for self education and moral development. 
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